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Letter  on  Monetary  Policy* 
The  following  letter  by  Professor  Milton  Friedman,  Department  of  Economics, 
University  of  Chicago,  was  written  in  response  to  a  letter  by  Arthur  F.  Burns, 
Chairman  of  the  Board of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
which  appeared  in  the  December  1973  REVIEW. 
The  Honorable  William  Proxmire 
Joint  Economic  Committee 
United  States  Senate 
Washington,  D.  C. 20510 
Dear  Senator  Proxmire  : 
On  September  17,  1973, you  asked  the  Chairman 
of  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  to  comment  on  certain  published  criticisms  of 
monetary  policy.  On  November  6,  1973,  the  Chair- 
man  replied  on  behalf  of  the  System.  This  Reply 
has  been  widely  publicized  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
System.  It  was  reprinted  in  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin  (November,  1973)  and  in at  least  five  of the 
separate  Federal  Reserve  Bank  Reviews. 
The  Reply  makes  many  valid  points.  Yet,  taken 
cisms.  It  appears  to  exonerate  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  from  any  appreciable  responsibility  for  the 
current  inflation,  yet  a  close  reading  reveals  that  it 
does  not  do  so,  and  other  evidence,  to  which  the 
Reply  does  not  refer,  establishes  a  strong  case  that 
the  Fed  has  contributed  to  inflation.  The  Reply 
appears  to  attribute  admitted  errors  in  monetary 
policy  to forces  outside  the  Fed,  yet  the  difficulties  in 
controlling  and  measuring  the  money  supply  are 
largely  of  the  Fed’s  own  making. 
The  essence  of  the  System’s  answer  to  the  criti- 
cisms  is  contained  in  three  sentences,  one  dealing 
with  the  Fed’s  responsibility  for  the  1973  inflation  ; 
the  other  two,  with  the  problem  of  controlling  and 
measuring  the  money  supply.  I  shall  discuss  each  in 
turn. 
* The  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  is publishing  Professor  Friedman’s  letter  of 
March  20  in  the  interest  of  promoting  the  widest  possible  public 
discussion  of  the  vital  issues  of  monetary  policy. 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR  INFLATION 
The  severe  rate  of  inflation  that  we  have 
experienced  in  1973  cannot  responsibly  be 
attributed  to  monetary  management  (italics 
added). 
As  written,  this  sentence  is  unexceptionable.  De- 
late  the  word  “severe,”  and  the  sentence  is  indefen- 
sible. 
The  Reply  correctly  cites  a  number  of  special 
factors  that  made  the  inflation  in  1973  more  severe 
than  could  have  been  expected  from  prior  monetary 
growth  alone-the  world-wide  economic  boom,  eco- 
logical  impediments  to  investment,  escalating  farm 
prices,  energy  shortages.  These  factors  may  well 
explain  why  consumer  prices  rose  by  8  per  cent  in 
1973  (fourth  quarter  1972  to  fourth  quarter  1973) 
instead  of,  say,  by  6  per  cent.  But  they  do  not 
explain  why  inflation  in  1973  would  have  been  as 
high  as  6  per  cent  in  their  absence.  They  do  not 
explain  why  consumer  prices  rose  more  than  25  per 
cent  in the  five  years  from  1968 to  1973. 
The  Reply  recognizes  that  “the  effects  of  stabili- 
zation  policies  occur  gradually  over  time”  and  that 
“it  is  never  safe  to  rely  on  just  one  concept  of 
money.”  Yet,  the  Reply  presents  statistical  data  on 
the  growth  of  money  or  income  or  prices  for  only 
1972  and  1973,  and  for  only  one  of  the  three  mone- 
tary  concepts  it  refers  to,  namely,  M1  (currency  plus 
demand  deposits),  the  one  that  had  the  lowest  rate 
of growth.  On  the  basis  of the  evidence  in the  Reply, 
there  is  no  way  to  evaluate  the  longer-term  policies 
of  the  Fed,  or  to  compare  current  monetary  policy 
with  earlier  policy,  or  one  concept  of  money  with 
another. 
From  calendar  year  1970  to  calendar  year  1973, 
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preceding  decade,  from  1960  to  1970, at  4.2  per  cent. 
More  striking  yet,  the  rate  of  growth  from  1970  to 
1973 was  higher  than  for  any  other  three-year  period 
since  the  end  of World  War  II. 
The  other  monetary  concepts  tell  the  same  story. 
From  1970  to  1973,  M2  (M1  plus  commercial  bank 
time  deposits  other  than  large  C.D.’s)  grew  at  the 
annual  rate  of  10.5  per  cent;  from  1960  to  1970,  at 
6.7  per  cent.  From  1970  to  1973,  M3  (M2  plus 
deposits  at  non-bank  thrift  institutions)  grew  at  the 
annual  rate  of  12.0  per  cent;  from  1960  to  1970,  at 
7.2  per  cent.  For  both  M2  and  M3,  the  rates  of 
growth  from  1970  to  1973  are  higher  than  for  any 
other  three-year  period  since  World  War  II. 
As  the  accompanying  chart  demonstrates,  prices 
show  the  same  pattern  as  monetary  growth  except 
for  the  Korean  War  inflation.  In  the  early  1960’s 
consumer  prices  rose  at  a  rate  of  1 to  2 per  cent  per 
year;  from  1970  to  1973,  at  an  average  rate  of  4.6 
per  cent;  currently,  they  are  rising  at  a  rate  of  not 
far  from  10  per  cent.  The  accelerated  rise  in  the 
quantity  of  money  has  clearly  been  reflected,  after 
some  delay,  in  a  similar  accelerated  rise  in  prices. 
However  limited  may  be  the  Fed’s  ability  to  con- 
trol  monetary  aggregates  from  quarter  to  quarter  or 
even  year  to year,  the  monetary  acceleration  depicted 
in the  chart,  which  extended  over  more  than  a decade, 
could  not  have  occurred  without  the  Fed’s  acquies- 
cence-to  put  it  mildly.  And  however  loose  may  be 
the  year-to-year  relation  between  monetary  growth 
and  inflation,  the  acceleration  in  the  rate  of  inflation 
over  the  past  decade  could  not  have  occurred  without 
the  prior  monetary  acceleration. 
Whatever  therefore  may  be  the  verdict  on  the 
short-run  relations  to  which  the  Reply  restricts  itself, 
the  Fed’s  long-run  policies  have  played  a  major  role 
in producing  our  present  inflation. 
There  is  much  evidence  on  the  shorter-term  as 
well  as  the  longer-term  relations.  Studies  for  the 
United  States  and  many  other  countries  reveal 
highly  consistent  patterns.  A  substantial  change  in 
the  rate  of  monetary  growth  which  is  sustained  for 
more  than  a  few  months  tends  to  be  followed  some 
six  or  nine  months  later  by  a  change  in  the  same 
direction  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  total  dollar  spend- 
ing.  To  begin  with,  most  of  the  change  in  spending 
is  reflected  in  output  and  employment.  Typically, 
though  not  always,  it takes  another  year  to  18 months 
before  the  change  in  monetary  growth  is  reflected  in 
prices.  On  the  average,  therefore,  it  takes  something 
like  two  years  for  a  higher  or  lower  rate  of  mone- 
tary  growth  to  be  reflected  in a higher  or  lower  rate 
of  inflation. 
Table  I  illustrates  this  relation  between  monetary 
growth  and  prices.  It  shows  rates  of change  for  three 
monetary  aggregates  and  for  consumer  prices  over 
two-year  spans  measured  from  the  first  quarter  of 
the  corresponding  years.  The  average  delay  in  the 
effect  of  monetary  change  on  prices  is allowed  for  by 
matching  each  biennium  for  prices  with  the  prior 
biennium  for  money.  Clearly,  on  the  average,  prices 
Table  I 
MONEY  AND  PRICES 
Annual  Per  Cent  Rates  of  Growth 
Dates  for 
Dates  for 
from  First  Quarter  to  First  Quarter  Consumer 
M1,  M2,  M3  of  indicated  Years  for  Prices 
M1  M2  M3 
Consumer 
Prices 
1959  to  1961  0.8  2.5  4.6  1.1  1961  to  1963 
1961  to  1963  2.4  5.9  7.6  1.3  1963  to  1965 
1963  to  1965  4.1  6.9  8.3  2.7  1965  to  1967 
1965  to  1967  3.7  7.2  6.7  4.2  1967  to  1969 
1967  to  1969  7.3  9.4  8.8  5.5  1969  to  1971 
1969  to  1971  4.8  6.3  6.4  3.9  1971  to  1973 
1971  to  1973  7.2  10.4  12.6  (9.1)*  1973  to 
*  First  quarter  1973  to  fourth  quarter  1973. 
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RECENT MONETARY  GROWTH  RATES 




Annual  Per  Cent  Rate  of  Growth  of 
M1  M2  M3 
7.0  11.8  12.8 
6.4  10.2  12.5 
7.4  9.5  10.6 
reflect  the  behavior  of  money  two  years  earlier. 
To  avoid  misunderstanding,  let  me  stress  that,  as 
the  table  illustrates,  this  is  an  average  relationship, 
not  a precise  relationship  that  can  be expected  to  hold 
in  exactly  the  same  way  in  every  month  or  year  or 
even  decade.  As  the  Reply  properly  stresses,  many 
factors  affect  the  course  of  prices  other  than  changes 
in  the  quantity  of  money,  Over  short  periods,  they 
may  sometimes  be  more  important.  But  the  Federal 
Reserve  and  the  Federal  Reserve  alone  has  the  re- 
sponsibility  for  the  quantity  of  money;  it  does  not 
have  the  responsibility,  and  certainly  not  sole  re- 
sponsibility,  for  the  other  factors  that  affect  inflation. 
And  the  record  is  unmistakably  clear  that,  over  the 
past  three  years  taken  as  a  whole,  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  System  has  exercised  that  responsibility  in  a 
way  that  has  exacerbated  inflation. 
This  conclusion  holds  not  only  for  the  three  years 
as  a  whole  but  also  for  each  year  separately,  as 
Table  II  shows.  The  one  encouraging  feature  is the 
slightly  lower  rate  of  growth  of  M2  and  M3  from 
1972  to  1973  than  in  the  earlier  two  years.  But  the 
tapering  off  is  mild  and  it  is  not  clear  that  it  is 
continuing.  More  important,  even  these  lower  rates 
are  far  too  high.  Steady  growth  of  M2 at  9  and  10 
per  cent  would  lead  to  an  inflation  of  about  6  or  7 
per  cent  per  year.  To  bring  inflation  down  to  3  per 
cent,  let  alone  to  zero,  the  rate  of growth  of  M2 must 
be  reduced  to  something  like  5 to  7 per  cent. 
CONTROLLING  AND  MEASURING 
THE MONEY  SUPPLY 
The  conduct  of  monetary  policy  could  be 
improved  if steps  were  taken  to  increase  the 
precision  with  which  the  money  supply  can 
be  controlled  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  Part 
of  the  present  control  problem  stems  from 
statistical  inadequacies  (italics  added). 
Again  these  sentences  from  the  Reply  are  literally 
correct,  but  they  give  not  the  slightest  indication  that 
the  difficulties  of  controlling  and  measuring  the 
money  supply  are  predominantly  of  the  Fed’s  own 
making.  The  only  specific  problems  that  the  Reply 
mentions  are  the  “paucity  of  data  on  deposits  at 
nonmember  banks”  and  the  fact  that  “nonmember 
banks  are  not  subject  to  the  same  reserve  require- 
ments  as  are  Federal  Reserve  Members.” 
Non-member  deposits  do raise  problems  in measur- 
ing  and  controlling  the  money  supply,  but  they  are 
minor  compared  to  other  factors.  The  Reply’s  em- 
phasis  on  them  is  understandable  on  other  grounds. 
Almost  since  it  was  established  in  1914,  the  Fed  has, 
been  anxious  to  bring  all  commercial  banks  into  the 
System,  and  has  been  worried  about  the  defection 
of banks  from  member  to  non-member  status.  It  has 
therefore  seized  every  occasion,  such  as  the  Reply 
provides,  to  stress  the  desirability  of  requiring  all 
banks  to be members  of the  System  or  at  least  subject 
to  the  same  reserve  requirements  as  member  banks. 
Control  Non-member  banks  raise  a  minor  prob- 
lem  with  respect  to  control.  Their  reserve  ratios 
do  differ  from  those  of  member  banks.  But  non- 
member  banks- hold  only  one-quarter  of  all  deposits, 
this  fraction  tends  to  change  rather  predictably,  and 
changes  in  it  can  be  monitored  and  offset  by  open 
market  operations. 
A  far  more  important  problem  with  respect  to 
control  is  the  lagged  reserve  requirement  that  was 
introduced  by  the  Fed  in  1968.  This  change  has  not 
worked  as  it  was  expected  to.  Instead,  by  intro- 
ducing  additional  delay  between  Federal  Reserve 
open  market  operations  and  the  money  supply,  it 
has  appreciably  reduced  “the  precision  with  which 
the  money  supply  can  be  controlled  by  the  Federal 
Reserve.”  Other  measures  taken  by  the  Fed  have 
had  the  same  effect.  In  an  article  on  this  subject 
published  recently,  George  Kaufman,  long  an  econo- 
mist  with  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  concluded, 
“by  increasing  the  complexity  of  the  money  multi- 
plier,  proliferating  rate  ceilings  on  different  types  of 
deposits,  and  encouraging  banks,  albeit  unintention- 
ally,  to  search  out  non-deposit  sources  of  funds,  the 
Federal  Reserve  has  increased  its  own  difficulty  in 
controlling  the  stock  of  money.  .  .  .  To  the  extent 
the  increased  difficulty  supports  the  long  voiced 
contention  of  some  Federal  Reserve  officials  that 
they  are  unable  to  control  the  stock  of  money  even  if 
they  so  wished,  the  actions  truly  represent  a  self- 
fulfilling  prophecy.” 
Even  more  basic  is  the  procedure  used  by  the 
Open  Market  Desk  of the  New  York  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  in  carrying  out  the  directives  of  the  Open 
Market  Committee.  These  directives  have  increas- 
ingly  been  stated  in  terms  of  desired  changes  in 
monetary  aggregates  rather  than  in  money-market 
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procedure  to  the  new  objective.  Instead,  it  tries  to 
use  money-market  conditions  (that  is,  interest  rates) 
as  an  indirect  device  to  control  monetary  aggregates. 
Many  students  of  the  subject  believe  that  this  tech- 
nique  is  inefficient.  Money-market  conditions  are 
affected  by  many  forces  other  than  the  Fed’s  oper- 
ations.  As  a  result,  the  Desk  cannot  control  money- 
market  conditions  very  accurately  and  cannot  predict 
accurately  what  changes  in  money-market  conditions 
are  required  to  produce  the  desired  change  in  mone- 
tary  aggregates. 
An  alternative  procedure  would  be  to  operate  di- 
rectly  on  high-powered  money,  which  the  Fed  can 
control  to  a  high  degree  of  precision.  Many  of  us 
believe  that  the  changes  in  high-powered  money  re- 
quired  to  produce  the  desired  change  in  monetary 
aggregates  can  be  estimated  tolerably  closely  even 
now.  They  could  be  estimated  with  still  greater 
precision  if the  Fed  were  to  rationalize  the  structure 
of  reserve  requirements. 
Measurement  Repeatedly,  in  the  past  few  years, 
the  Fed’s  statisticians  have  retrospectively  revised 
estimates  of  monetary  aggregates,  sometimes,  as  in 
December  1972,  by  very  substantial  amounts. 
The  one  source  of measurement  error  mentioned  in 
the  Reply  is the  unavailability  of data  on non-member 
banks.  This  is a source  of error  because  non-member 
banks  report  deposit  data  on  only  two,  or  sometimes 
four,  dates  a  year.  The  resulting  error  in  estimates 
for  intervening  or  subsequent  dates  has  sometimes 
been  sizable,  but  mostly  it  has  accounted  for  a minor 
part  of  the  statistical  revisions.  In  any  event,  this 
source  of error  can  be reduced  drastically  by  sampling 
and  other  devices  which  the  Fed  could  undertake  on 
its  own  without  additional  legislation. 
More  important  sources  of  error  are  seasonal  ad- 
justment  procedures  and  the  estimation  and  treat- 
ment  of cash  items,  non-deposit  liabilities,  and  foreign 
held  deposits. 
It  has  long  seemed  to  me  little  short  of  scandalous 
that  the  money  supply  figures  should  require  such 
substantial  and  frequent  revision.  The  Fed  is  itself 
the  primary  source  of  data  required  to  measure  the 
money  supply  ; it can  get  additional  data  it may  need  ; 
it  has  a large  and  highly  qualified  research  staff.  Yet 
for  years  it has  failed  to  undertake  the  research  effort 
necessary  to  correct  known  defects  in  its  money 
supply  series.* 
* On  January  31.  1974, after  this  comment  had  been  drafted,  the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  announced  “the 
formation  of  a  special  committee  of  prominent  academic  experts  to 
review  concepts.  procedures  and  methodology  involved  in  estimating 
the  money  supply  and  other  monetary  aggregates.”  I  have  agreed 
to  serve  as  a  member  of  this  committee. 
CONCLUSION 
For  more  than  a  decade,  monetary  growth  has 
been  accelerating.  It  has  been  higher  in the  past  three 
years  than  in  any  other  three-year  period  since  the 
end  of  World  War  II.  Inflation  has  also  accelerated 
over  the  past  decade.  It  too  has  been  higher  in  the 
past  three  years  than  in  any  other  three-year  period 
since  1947.  Economic  theory  and  empirical  evidence 
combine  to  establish  a  strong  presumption  that  the 
acceleration  in monetary  growth  is largely  responsible 
for  the  acceleration  in  inflation.  Nothing  in  the 
Reply  of the  Chairman  of the  Federal  Reserve  System 
to  your  letter  contradicts  or  even  questions  that  con- 
clusion.  And  nothing  in  that  Reply  denies  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  had  the  power  to  prevent 
the  sharp  acceleration  in  monetary  growth. 
I  recognize,  of  course,  that  there  are  now,  and 
have  been  in  the  past,  strong  political  pressures  on 
the  Fed  to  continue  rapid  monetary  growth.  Once 
inflation  has  proceeded  as  far  as  it  already  has,  it 
will,  as  the  Reply  says,  take  some  time  to  eliminate 
it.  Moreover,  there  is literally  no way  to end  inflation 
that  will  not  involve  a  temporary,  though  perhaps 
fairly  protracted,  period  of  low  economic  growth  and 
relatively  high  unemployment.  Avoidance  of  the 
earlier  excessive  monetary  growth  would  have  had 
far  less  costly  consequences  for  the  community  than 
cutting  monetary  growth  down  to  an  appropriate 
level  will  now  have.  But  the  damage  has  been  done. 
The  longer  we wait,  the  harder  it  will  be.  And  there 
is  no  other  way  to  stop  inflation. 
The  only  justification  for  the  Fed’s  vaunted  inde- 
pendence  is  to  enable  it  to  take  measures  that  are 
wise  for  the  long-run  even  if  not  popular  in  the 
short-run.  That  is why  it  is  so  discouraging  to  have 
the  Reply  consist  almost  entirely  of  a  denial  of  re- 
sponsibility  for  inflation  and  an  attempt  to  place  the 
blame  elsewhere. 
If  the  Fed  does  not  explain  to  the  public  the 
nature  of  our  problem  and  the  costs  involved  in 
ending  inflation;  if  it  does  not  take  the  lead  in  im- 
posing  the  temporarily  unpopular  measures  required, 
who  will ? 
Sincerely  yours, 
Milton  Friedman 
Professor  of  Economics 
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